Ride sharing allows multiple persons to share their one vehicle for their trips instead of using multiple vehicles. This can reduce the number of vehicles in the street, which consequently can reduce air pollution, traffic congestion and transportation cost. However, ride sharing organization requires passengers to report sensitive location information about their trips to a trip organizing server (TOS) which creates a serious privacy issue. In addition, the existing ride sharing schemes are neither flexible nor scalable in the sense that they require a driver and a rider to have exactly the same trip to share a ride, and they does not consider the vehicle occupancy during the ride sharing organization (i.e., allowing more than two people to share the same trip), and they are inefficient if applied to large geographic areas. In this paper, we propose two efficient privacy-preserving ride sharing organization schemes for Nontransferable Ride sharing Service (NRS) and Transferable Ride sharing Service (TRS). In NRS, a rider can share a ride from his/her trip's start to destination with only one driver whereas, in TRS, a rider can transfer between multiple drivers while en route until he reaches his destination. In the proposed schemes, the ride sharing area is divided into a number of small geographic areas, called cells, and each cell has a unique identifier. Each driver/rider should encrypt his trip's data and send an encrypted ride sharing offer/request to the TOS. In NRS scheme, Bloom filters are used to compactly represent the trip information before encryption. Then, the TOS can measure the similarity of the encrypted trips data to organize shared rides without revealing either the users' identities or the location information. In TRS scheme, drivers report their encrypted routes, an then the TOS builds an encrypted directed graph that is passed to a modified version of Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm to search for an optimal path of rides that can achieve a set of preferences defined by the riders. Although TRS can be used for NRS, performance evaluation shows that TRS requires more communication overhead than NRS. Our formal proof demonstrates that the proposed schemes can preserve users privacy and our experimental results using routes extracted from real maps demonstrate that the proposed schemes are scalable for large cities.
INTRODUCTION
R IDE sharing, also known as carpooling, is a service that enables multiple persons who have similar trips at the same time to travel together in one vehicle instead of using multiple vehicles. It can reduce air pollution and traffic congestion by reducing the number of vehicles traveling on the roads. In addition, it can reduce the trip cost by splitting the cost among several persons. Recently, the popularity of ride sharing has significantly increased, providing services to passengers at various locations [1] - [3] . As of 2010, there were at least 613 ride sharing platforms in North America mostly based on the internet [4] - [6] . Furthermore, government policies have also been made in many countries to encourage citizens to share rides. Making High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes are one of such strategies. It allows to vehicles with more than two persons on-board to use a privileged lane [7] - [9] . Another strategy to motivate sharing rides is providing toll discounts and reimbursements [10] .
By means of smart phones, GPS systems, and Internet connectivity, the process of organizing shared rides is greatly facilitated. The idea is that users are required to register with an online platform that organizes shared rides, and then a user having a vehicle (driver) and seeking to share ride with other users (riders) sends a ride sharing offer to a Trip Organizing Server (TOS). This offer should include the trip data, such as the starting location, destination, trip time and route. Also, riders looking for shared rides should first send ride sharing requests with similar information to the TOS. The TOS then matches the drivers' offers with riders' requests to assign one or multiple riders to each driver. Nevertheless, the TOS is run and operated by private company that may be interested to collect information about the users' locations and activities.
Different privacy-preserving ride sharing schemes are proposed in the literature [11] - [17] . However, existing schemes lack or do not consider the following issues. First, some schemes [16] and [17] are not efficient when applied to large geographic maps, which restrains them to small ride sharing area, this because each users needs to report an encryption that encompasses all the city subregions to report his/her location. Second, the schemes [11] - [17] are not flexible in the way that they do not allow the riders to prescribe their ride sharing preferences such as the trip length, if they are willing to transfer between different drivers to reach their destination (transferable ride), the maximum number of transfers, etc. Finally, existing schemes [11] - [17] can not be used to organize transferable rides. As will be demonstrated in the performance analysis, transferable rides can increase the number of served riders, and thus increase each vehicle occupancy, enhance the ride sharing utilization, reduce traffic congestion, and reduce air pollution. Compared to the existing schemes, efficiency, flexibility, and transferable rides were taken into consideration in our schemes by allowing the rider to select his pickup, dropoff, and his preferences, while the TOS can fulfill the rider request efficiently. Although the focus of our schemes is on organizing shared rides (carpooling), the proposed schemes can also be adapted to work with ridehailing services [18] and [19] , such as Uber and Lyft. This can be achieved in the proposed schemes by only reporting the rider pickup location.
In this paper, we aim to address the aforementioned issues by proposing two schemes for the organization of shared rides, namely, non transferable ride sharing service (NRS) and transferable ride sharing service (TRS). Both schemes enable the TOS to organize shared rides without knowing any private information about the users' locations and activities. In the NRS scheme, a rider can share a ride with only one driver, while in TRS, the rider needs to take multiple vehicles to reach his destination. In latter case, the rider has to switch between multiple drivers during his trip. The users can select the type of service they need, e.g., NRS is more preferable to elderly and disabled people. They can also limit the trip length and the number of transfers of the trip that is returned by the TOS. In both schemes, the ride sharing area is divided into cells (geographic areas) and each cell is assigned a unique identifier. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that address the privacy preserving two cases of ride sharing organization, NRS and TRS.
For NRS organization, riders and drivers should submit to the TOS encrypted binary vectors representing their trip information. Then, the TOS uses our modified kNN encryption [20] - [22] to perform similarity measurement on the encrypted trip vectors to organize shared rides without learning any sensitive location information to preserve users' privacy. A Bloom filter [23] is used to compactly store the trip data to reduce the communication overhead and create the binary vector needed for the kNN similarity measurement. On the other hand, in TRS, drivers should report the encryption of the individual cells on their routes. Then, the TOS builds a directed graph for all the drivers individual cells using the measured similarity between the encrypted individual cells. After that, a modified Dijkstra's searching algorithm [24] is used to search through this graph to determine the route that can achieve the rider's preferences, constrains, and requirements. For example, a rider can request a minimum number of cells ride sharing which means the shortest path between his location and his destination despite the number of transfers required. In another case, a rider can request the minimum number of transfers ride sharing which could be preferred especially by elderly and disabled people.
Our formal proof demonstrates that the proposed schemes can organize shared rides without disclosing private information. In addition, both schemes were implemented with MATLAB using real map and routes. The experimental results demonstrate that the communication and storage overheads are acceptable, and our schemes are scalable and can be used in cases of small and large cities. Although TRS can be used to organize both transferable and non-transferable, The NRS provides better efficiency in terms of the communication overhead for non-transferable services.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The network and threat models are introduced in Section 2. Preliminaries and design goals are given in Section 3. The proposed schemes are presented in Section 4. Security and Privacy analysis are discussed in Section 5. performance evaluations are given in Section 6.1. The related works are presented in Section 7. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
NETWORK AND THREAT MODELS

Network Model
As shown in Figure 2 , the considered network model consists of an offline Trusted Authority (TA), drivers, riders and a TOS. The TA is responsible for generating and distributing unique secret keys to each driver, rider and the TOS. Drivers and riders can use a smartphone application to send their encrypted trip information to the TOS through the internet. The TOS should execute one of the proposed schemes based on the drivers 'and riders' preferences and send the results back to the drivers and riders. Figure 1 shows the ride sharing area considered in our simulation. As shown is the figure, the ride sharing area is divided into cells and each cell has a unique identification number (ID). To achieve forward and backward privacy as discussed in section 5, we propose permuting the distribution of the cells identifiers in the city every day, so that the TOS cannot link old trips' information to the new one. The basic structure of the pseudo-random generation a C i + b mod N c can be used [25] , where a and b are shared secrets between the users, C i is the cell identifier, and N c is the number of cells in the city. All the users can compute shared secrets a and b by hashing two shared seeds with the current date.
Threat Model
We consider that the drivers, the riders, and the TOS are "honest-but-curious", i.e., they follow the proposed schemes and do not aim to disrupt their operation, however, they are curious to learn location information about any user in the system such as the trip's pickup/dropoff locations and times. The attackers are also interested in knowing the identities of users who share rides with each other. In addition, we assume that the attackers can be internal or external. The TOS and legitimate users can be internal attacker. The external attacker can eavesdrop on all the communications in the system and match eavesdropped offers and requests to learn sensitive information on the users' locations and identities.
PRELIMINARIES AND DESIGN GOALS
Bloom Filter
Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure that can reduce the overhead of storing and searching a set of elements [23] . The Bloom filter algorithm takes N items and uses different α hash functions to compute a bit vector of length m bits that stores the items. The α hash functions are defined as
Initially, all the Bloom filter bits are set to zero. To add an element C to the filter, C is hashed using the α hash functions and the bit locations resulted from each hash function is set to one. Figure 3 shows an example to a 16-bit Bloom filter using three hash functions.
Assume a set of elements S = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . } stored in the Bloom filter. To check whether a given element C belongs to S, a Bloom filter query algorithm computes the α hash values of C to get α locations in the vector. If any of the bits of these α location is zero, C is definitely not in the set, but if all the bits are ones, then there is a high probability that C is in the set. It is possible that an element does not belong to the Bloom filter and the corresponding bit locations are set to ones by other elements in the Bloom filter which is called false positive. The false-positive probability of a Bloom filter can be computed by (1 − (1 − 1/m) αN ) α [23] . Given the number of different hash functions α and the number of elements N , the size of the Bloom filter m such that the false positive probability is very small and can be determined.
Design Goals
Our goal is to develop two privacy-preserving ride sharing organization schemes for NRS and TRS with the following objectives.
• TRS and NRS: As mentioned earlier, the TRS and NRS are both needed to the users, and thus, the proposed schemes should be able to organize the two services efficiently. • Efficiency and scalability. The schemes should be efficient in case of a large ride sharing region (i.e. big cities) and serve a large number of ride sharing requests. • User requirements and preferences. Users should be able to select the type of service (NRS or TRS) and their search preference such as trip length, maximum number of transfers, etc. • Trip data privacy. The TOS should be able to organize shared rides without knowing the pickup/dropoff locations and times or even any road segment in users trips. Eavesdroppers and malicious users should not be able to learn any sensitive information about other users' trip data. • Forward and backward privacy: To prevent the TOS from inferring incremental side information over time, the TOS should not be able to match the encrypted trip information sent in one day to the information that sent earlier or will be sent in the future. • Data Linkability: (1) Requests-user un-linkability: Given different ride sharing requests sent from a user, the TOS should not learn if these requests are sent from the same user or not; (2) Driver-rider pair un-linkability: If a driverrider pair shares a ride, the TOS should not identify the same pair when they share rides in the future; (3) Same requests un-linkability: The TOS should not link the ride sharing requests (or offers) of the same trip at different times. • Users' anonimity: The TOS must ensure that the received requests/offers are coming from legitimate users. However, it should not be able to reveal the real identity of the users from the credentials they use for authentication or the locations they visit. 
PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents the details of the proposed schemes. For better readability, the main notations used throughout this section are given in Table 1 4
.1 System Bootstrap
The TA chooses two sets of keys as master secret keys, K N T for NRS and K T for TRS, where K N T = {S N T , M 1 , M 2 , N 1 , . . . , N 8 } and K T = {S T , V 1 , V 2 , T 1 , . . . , T 8 }. S N T and S T are binary vectors used as splitting indicators during the encryption process, as will be explained later in this section. The size of S N T is m, where m is the size of the binary vector to be encrypted in NRS scheme. All other elements in the set K N T are m × m invertible matrices. Similarly, the size of S T is n, where n is the size of the binary vector to be encrypted in TRS scheme and all other elements in the set, K T , are n × n invertible matrices of random secret numbers.
Then, the TA generates the TOS secret keys. The keys consist of four random matrices X, Y, W , and Z. The two matrices X and Y are to be used in NRS while W and Z are to be used in TRS. Note that, X and Y are of size m × m, while W and Z are of size n × n.
Each user in the system can play the role of a driver or a rider. Also, each user can offer/request non-transferable or transferable service. Using the master secret sets and the TOS secrets, the TA computes unique secret keys for each user in the system as follows. 
1) Driver in NRS Secret Key:
2 . Note that, DT SK key set has eight elements where each element is a matrix of size n × n. 4) Rider in TRS mode Secret Key:
where E T , F T , G T , and H T are random and invertible matrices of size n × n, such that E T + F T = V 1 , and G T + H T = V 2 . Note that, RT SK key set has eight elements where each element is a matrix of size n × n. In addition to the four key sets, each user receives from the TA a set of certified pseudonymous that are used for authentication with the TOS. In addition, each user should receive the two vectors S N T and S T .
Non-transferable ride sharing organization
Overview
The proposed privacy-preserving NRS scheme uses a modified version of the kNN encryption scheme [26] and Bloom filters. In the proposed scheme, each driver creates an encrypted ride sharing offer, and each rider creates an encrypted ride sharing request. The TOS receives these offers and requests and computes their similarity to organize nontransferable shared rides without revealing any location information. Finally, the TOS notifies the drivers and riders that can share rides.
Ride-Sharing Cases
Three different ride sharing cases are considered for the NRS scheme as shown in Figure 4 . In all cases, the driver chooses a pickup area around his trip's start location where he can pickup riders. If the rider's start location lies outside the driver's pickup area, then ride sharing is impossible. For the dropoff area, there are three possibilities, as follows.
• Matched Pickup and Matched Dropoff (MP/MD). As shown in Figure 4 (a), the destination of the rider lies within the dropoff area defined by the driver.
• Matched Pickup and on-Route Dropoff (MP/RD). As shown in Figure 4 (b), the destination of the rider lies on the driver's route. Therefore, the driver drops the rider off at his destination and then continues his trip. • Matched Pickup and Extended Dropoff (MP/ED). As shown in Figure 4 (c), the destination of the driver lies on the rider's route. Therefore, the AV first drops the driver off, then it delivers the rider to his destination, and finally, it drives itself back to the driver's location. This case is possible only in case of autonomous vehicles AVs.
Note that, these ride sharing cases considered in subsubsection 4.2.2 where the riders and drivers have the same pickup area can be easily extended so that the driver can pickup riders at any point on his route.
Driver's Offer
Each driver should represent his pickup area, dropoff area, and his route by a list of cell IDs. For example, the figure shows a user's route that can be represented as
The driver creates a ride sharing offer that has four encrypted vectors referred to as indices. These indices contain driver's trip data including pickup area index I Figure 5 shows the process of computing the trip route index I (r) D by the driver. First, the route cells are passed to a Bloom filter building algorithm to generate a binary column vector P (r) of size m. Note that, The algorithm is modified to guarantee that the α hash values results by each hash function are distinct. For example, if H i (C) = H j (C), a counter is concatenated to C such that H i (C, counter) = H j (C, counter), where counter is the first number that can make the two hash values different [23] . Then, the driver uses the key set DN SK, defined in subsection 4.1, to encrypt P (r) using modified kNN encryption scheme [26] . For encryption, the driver uses S N T to split P (r) into two random column vectors p (r) and p (r) of the same size as P (r) . The splitting is done as follows. If the j th bit of S N T is zero, then, p (r) (j) and p (r) (j) are set similar to P (r) (j), while if it is one, p (r) (j) and p (r) (j) are set to two random numbers such that their summation is equal to P (r) (j). After splitting P (r) , the encrypted index I 
where
D is a column vector of size 8m elements, and each element is a column vector of size m. Note that, every time the same vector is encrypted, the ciphertext looks different due to the random numbers used in creating p (r) and p (r) .
Using the same process, the pickup and dropoff indices, I Along with the indices, the driver should send to the TOS the maximum number of riders with whom he can share rides. Also, the driver should encrypt his contact information and send it to the TOS along with his anonymous credentials and signature.
Moreover, the driver can select some of the preferred ride sharing cases. For example, he might prefer only MP/RD case so that riders can not know his final destination, or he might prefer only MP/MD case so that he never stops during the trip, or he can select more than one ride sharing case.
Rider's Request
Each rider should generate a ride sharing request that has the pickup location index I , the rider's pickup location is passed to the Bloom filter building algorithm to generate a binary row vector Q (Cp) . Since the rider's pickup location is one cell, his Bloom filter contains exactly α bits set to 1. Then, S N T is used to split Q (Cp) into two random row vectors q (Cp) and q (Cp) of the same size as Q (Cp) . The splitting process of the rider data is opposite to that of the drivers. If the j th bit of S N T is one, then, q (Cp) (j) and q (Cp) (j) are set similar to Q (Cp) (j), while if it is zero, q (Cp) (j) and q (Cp) (j) are set to two random numbers such that their summation is equal to Q (Cp) (j). Then, the rider can compute the encrypted index I (Cp) R using the key set RN SK and the vectors q (Cp) and q (Cp) as follows
is a row vector size 8m, and each element is a row vector of size m. Using a similar process, the rider can generate I (t)
, and I (r) R . Also, the rider should encrypt his contact information and send it to the TOS along with his anonymous credentials and signature.
Organizing Shared Rides
First, the TOS must ensure that the received offers and requests are coming from a legitimate user in the system. This can be achieved by verifying the received credentials associated with each offer/request. In addition, the TOS multiplies elements in all the received offer indices by X -1 and elements in all the received requests by Y to remove its secrets X and Y -1 from the offers and requests respectively. Thus, only the TOS can match drivers' and riders' indices because its secrets X and Y are needed to match the indices.
After that, the TOS starts to organize the shared rides as follows. Based on the ride sharing cases presented in subsubsection 4.2.2, the driver's offer and the rider's request should match at the trip starting time and pickup location. Therefore, the TOS first measures the similarity between the time indices by computing a dot product operation between I D . Since only one bit is set to 1 in the unencrypted time vectors, the dot product result is 1 if and only if the driver and the rider start their trips within the same time slot (See equation (3)). In this case, the TOS measures the similarity between the driver pickup area index I (Cp) D and the rider pickup location. More specifically, based on equations 1 and 2, the result can be computed as follows.
Since the rider's pickup location index I (Cp) R represents only one cell, his Bloom filter contains exactly α bits set to 1, this α bits corresponds to the α locations pointed by the hash functions used by the Bloom filter. Therefore, if the measured similarity between I (Cp) R and I (Cp) D is exactly α, then, the rider pickup location lies within the driver pickup area. On the other hand, if the measured similarity is less than α, then the rider pickup location lies outside the driver pickup area and ride sharing is not possible between this driver and that rider. For the drivers' offers and riders' requests which are matched in trip start time and trip pickup locations, the TOS proceeds with the search process to find which ride sharing case can be organized.
Consider that the driver requests to share rides with N r riders with preferences sorted as follows: MP/MD, MP/RD, and MP/ED. Therefore, whenever the TOS finds N r requests that match the driver's offer, it connects the matched driver and riders.
• Organizing MP/MD shared ride. As shown in Figure 4 (a), the TOS measures the similarity of the rider's dropoff index I
. If the result is α, then an MP/MD ride sharing is possible, otherwise, the TOS checks the next ride sharing case. • Organizing MP/RD shared ride. As shown in Figure 4 R . If the result is α, then an MP/ED ride sharing is possible, otherwise, it is not possible to organize a shared ride between this driver and that rider. After TOS finds N r riders who can share ride with the driver, it should forward the encrypted contact information of the driver to the rider and vice versa.
Transferable ride sharing organization
Overview
The proposed privacy-preserving TRS scheme uses a modified version of the kNN encryption scheme [26] and a modified version of Dijkstra shortest path algorithm. Figure 7 shows flowchart of the TRS scheme. First, each driver creates an encrypted ride sharing offer that includes the individual cells on his trip and sends the offer to the TOS. The TOS should first use the drivers' trips' data to build a directed graph required for organizing shared rides. Each rider creates an encrypted ride sharing request that includes the source and the destination of his route. In addition, the TOS determines the weights of the directed graph by using the ride sharing preferences sent by the rider. The TOS uses the riders' requests to search the directed graph to find the path that can satisfy the drivers' requirements. Finally, TOS sends back the results to the drivers and riders. In addition, TOS should make any necessary updates to the directed graph, e.g., if a vehicle reaches its maximum capacity, its nodes should be removed from the graph. The graph update step does not need much computations and does not require building the whole graph again. 
Data Representation
As in NRS scheme, in TRS, the ride sharing area is divided into geographic regions, called cells each having a unique identifier C i as illustrated in Figure 1 . Unlike NRS, each cell in the driver's route is represented individually by a binary vector that has the location and time components as shown in Figure 6 . The location is represented by the cell identifier while the time component is the expected time the user will be in the cell. We define k as the number of bits that are needed to represent the cells of the whole ride sharing area in a binary format. For the location component, 2k bits are used to represent the location cell identifier in binary and its complement. The complement value is used so that the number of common ones between any two spatially matched cell vectors is k.
For the time component, bits are used to represent the whole day ( i.e., 24 hours), where each bit represents a specific time interval. Each user should set the bit corresponding to the time interval in which he/she will be in the cell. Hence, any two spatially and temporally matched cell vectors should give k + 1 common ones.
Driver's Offer
For each cell C i in a driver's route, the driver creates a binary vector of length n = 2k + and encrypts it to get an index vector for each cell in his trip's route. For each cell, the driver generates two indices (I is encrypted using RT SK and is used to enable the TOS to match all the drivers' trip data to generate a directed graph required for searching operations. For generating I (Ci) D , the driver uses the binary vector S T to split each binary cell's vector denoted as P (Ci) into two vectors p (Ci) and p (Ci) of the same size. If the j th bit of S N T is zero, then, p (Ci) (j) and p (Ci) (j) are set similar to P (Ci) (j), while if it is one, p (Ci) (j) and p (Ci) (j) are set to two random numbers such that their summation is equal to P (Ci) (j). After splitting P (Ci) , the driver uses (p (Ci) , p (Ci) ) and the key set DT SK to compute the index I (Ci) D as follows.
where I (Ci) D is a column vector of size 8n, and each element is a column vector of size n. For generating I (Ci) R , the binary vector S T is used to split Q (Ci) into two vectors q (Ci) and q (Ci) of the same size. Note that, for the same cell P (Ci) and Q (Ci) are the same. Then, S T is used to split Q (Ci) into two random binary row vectors q (Ci) and q (Ci) of the same size as Q (Ci) . The splitting process of Q (Ci) is opposite to that of P (Ci) . If the j th bit of S T is one, then, q (Ci) (j) and q (Ci) (j) are set similar to Q (Ci) (j), while if it is zero, q (Ci) (j) and q (Ci) (j) are set to two random numbers such that their summation is equal to Q (Ci) (j). Then, the driver can compute the encrypted index I (Ci) R using the key set RN SK and the vectors q (Ci) and q (Ci) as follows
where I Ci R is a row vector of size 8m elements, and each element is a row vector of size n. Each driver should encrypt and send the indices of the individual cells of his route to the TOS. Other information such as the number of riders who can share the trip with, and his contact information should
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(c) Connecting two routes. also be encrypted and sent to the TOS along with the his anonymous credentials and signature.
Building A Directed Graph
After TOS receives the cell indices of drivers' routes, it constructs a graph that contains all the cells from all the drivers without knowing the exact spatial locations of the cells to preserve privacy. Given driver k route, where cell j on his/her route is denoted as D k,j , the TOS builds the directed graph by measuring the similarity of cells indices from all drivers. To do this, two types of graph edges are used namely: 1) Route Edges. These edges are unidirectional and connects different cells that belong to the same driver. 2) Transfer Edges. These edges are bidirectional and connects the matched cells of different drivers. The TOS adds a route edge between any two consecutive cells D k,j and D k,j+1 of driver k. As shown in Figure 8(a) , there are two drivers each having five nodes in his route and the route edges are added between the same driver cells. After adding route edges, TOS measures the similarity of every pair of cells for every pair of drivers in order to add transfer edges to the graph. Figure 8 ). If any of the matching result is exactly equal to k + 1, it means that both drivers have been spatially and temporally matched, i.e. they will be in the same cell at the same time. In that case, TOS adds a bidirectional edge (transfer edge) between the two nodes.
Destinations
Route Edge
Transfer Edge Fig. 9 . Examples of ride sharing preferences assuming three drivers and one rider request from node D 1,1 with either node D 2,4 or D 3,5 as destination. Note that, two solution exist for M int with different number of cells
As shown in Figure 8 (c), TOS finishes adding all the transfer edges to connect the two routes. After connecting the two routes, a new route can be added to Figure 8 (c) graph using the same technique and the full graph is completed after connecting the routes from all drivers. Note that, even if a graph is constructed and a driver sent a route, it is easy to add this route to the constructed graph.
As an example for similarity matching, consider the TOS measures the similarity of an arbitrary cell C a encrypted using RT SK and has an index I D . More specifically, based on Equations 4 and 5, the similarity measurement can be computed as follows and send them to the TOS. Also, the rider should encrypt his contact information and sends it to the TOS along with his anonymous credentials and signature.
Organization of Shared Rides
2-Graph Weights Based on Rider's Preferences.
Since riders have different requirements and needs, our scheme allows them to prescribe their preferences in the shared rides. The riders' preferences are used by the TOS to determine the graph's weights so that the optimal search result is returned to the rider. The number of cells traveled by the rider and the number of transfers done by the rider are used to prescribe the rider's preferences. Riders' preferences are given as follows.
1) Minimum number of cells (M in c ). In this preference, rider can require the minimum distance to reach his destination (i.e. the number of cells). TOS should return the path to the destination that has the fewest number of cells. If TOS finds different paths that can satisfy M in c , it returns the path that has the least number of transfers among these paths. 2) Maximum number of cells (M ax c ). In this preference, rider requires TOS to return the path that has the number of cells less than a set threshold value. If TOS finds different paths that can satisfy M ax c , it returns the path that has the least number of transfers among these paths. 3) Minimum number of transfers (M in t ). In this preference, rider specifies the minimum number of transfers. This preference satisfies the requirements of the elder people or the people with disability as they can request for a route with M in t without considering the number of cells. If TOS finds different paths that can satisfy M in t , it returns the path that has the least number of cells. 4) Maximum number of transfers (M ax t ). In this preference, the rider requires TOS to return only the route that satisfies a specific threshold for the number of transfers. If TOS finds multiple routes that can satisfy M ax t , it returns the route that has the least number of cells.
In addition, any combinations of the aforementioned preferences can be used such as, minimum number of cells and transfers (M in c,t ), minimum number of transfers and maximum number of cells (M in t , M ax c ), Minimum number of cells and maximum number of transfers (M in c , M ax t ), and maximum number of cells and maximum number of transfers (M ax c,t ).
When TOS receives the rider's data, it uses the rider's preference to set the weight of each edge in the directed graph. For M in c and M ax c , the weights of transfer edges are set to a small value , while the weights of route edges are set to one. The weights for transfer edges should be zero as they occur within the same cell, however, in order to eliminate zero weight cycles in the graph, a small value, , is used. On the other hand, for M in t and M ax t , the weight of transfer edges is one, while the weight of route edges is . For the other combinations of the aforementioned preferences, a weighting process similar to that described for the above two preferences is used. After determining the weight of each edge in the graph according to the rider's preference, the TOS is ready to run the search algorithm. Figure 9 gives an example for the different options supported by the proposed scheme that satisfy all the requirements and needs of the riders. In this figure, three drivers' routes are connected through a directed graph that represents different routes the rider can take. In addition, it assumes that one rider requests a ride from the source cell D 1,1 that has only one driver (driver one), to the destination cell where two drivers can go (driver two and driver three), i.e., D 2,4 or D 3,5 , which have the same physical location. If the rider requests M in c , the TOS re- for 3, 5 } because both of these paths have only one transfer, and for M in c,t the TOS returns {D 1,1 , D 1,2 , D 1,3 , D 2,1 , D 2,2 , D 2,3 , D 2,4 }.
3-Search the Graph.
To organize shared rides, TOS should first search the directed graph to find the route and thus the drivers that satisfy the riders' preferences. Compared to other graph searching algorithms that target the shortest paths between nodes in a weighted graphs, Dijkstra's algorithm is the fastest single-source multi destination shortest path algorithm with searching complexity of O(v log(v)) [24] , where v is the number of vertices in the graph .
We modified Dijkstra's searching algorithm [24] to enable TOS find all shortest paths with equal cost which the existing Dijkstra's algorithm cannot find. The original algorithm returns only one shortest path for each request, whereas in our scheme, some cases need the whole set of shortest paths resulted from a certain request. For example, in M in c,t , we need to know the whole set of the paths that satisfy the minimum number of cells and the whole set of paths that satisfy the minimum number of transfers to take the intersection between them to get the paths that can achieve minimum numbers of cells and transfers. Given rider source and destination, the modified algorithm can find all the shortest paths connecting them on the graph. The modified algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
In order to organize shared rides that can satisfy the preference's of the riders, TOS matches the startup cell of the rider to all the nodes in the graph to determine the possible source nodes. The same procedure should be performed using the rider's destination cell to find the possible destination nodes. Note that, possible source/destination nodes have the same physical location, however, they belong to different drivers. Then, TOS uses the modified Dijkstra's searching algorithm to find all paths between source and destination that satisfy the specified rider preferences. Finally, the TOS should returns the contact information of the riders/drivers and the ciphertext of the cells of the transfers. In addition, TOS updates the directed graph by taking off the edges of the associated offers if they have exhausted their ride sharing capacity.
PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss how our schemes can achieve the privacy-preservation goals mentioned in subsection 3.2. Theorem 1. The TOS can organize shared NRS and TRS rides without learning any spatial or temporal data of the trip.
Proof: We provide a proof for the theorem to the NRS scheme and by the same analogy the proof can be used to TRS. First, we define some notations:
History. For a set of drivers' routes R, the history is a set of indices I = {I In particular, the indistinguishability follows directly from the semantic security of kNN encryption scheme.
In addition, the random numbers used in kNN encryption scheme can make the ciphertext of the same data look different when encrypted multiple times. If a malicious user intercepts the ciphertext of another user's trip, he cannot decrypt it because the secret key set is needed for decryption and each user has a unique key.
Beside the aforementioned features, the proposed schemes acheives the following privacy features. 1) Users' anonimity. By using anonymous credentials, TOS can learn that a received ride sharing request/offer is sent by a legitimate user without learning his/her identity. Also, by hiding the users' locations, the TOS cannot identify the users from the locations they visit. 2) Offers/requests matching. No other user or eavesdropper can match drivers' offers to riders' requests except the TOS, this is because of the TOS' secrets are needed as indicated in Equation (3) and (6). 3) Users' unique keys . Because different keys are used by riders and drivers, users cannot decrypt other users' encrypted trips or requests to know their locations. 4) Forward and backward privacy: By frequently changing the cells' identifiers, the TOS cannot collect side information vy matching the indices sent by the users at a given time to the indices sent before (historical data) or after. 5) Requests-users un-linkability. Given different ride sharing requests sent from one user at different times, TOS cannot learn if these requests are sent from the same user or not. 6) Driver-rider pair un-linkability. If one rider shares a ride with one driver, our scheme does not leak any information that can help the TOS to identify the driver-rider pair when they share rides in the future. This is because of the use of anonymous credentials to authenticate the users, and because of the trip's encrypted data cannot be matched to old data due to changing the cells' identifiers. 7) Same request un-linkability. The encrypted requests of the same trip look different when encrypted at different times even if they have the same trip information. This is due to the random numbers used to encrypt the requests.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
Experiment Setup
The proposed schemes were implemented using MATLAB, and a server with an Intel® Xeon® Processor E5-2420 @2.2GHZ (2 processors) and 32 GB RAM. In our experiments, we used real maps to create a set of trips extracted from the map. First, we used OpenStreetMap project [27] to get a real map for the city of Nashville, TN, USA as shown in Figure 1 . The ride sharing area is 75.5 km × 33 km. This area is divided into 15,687 cells with a cell size of 400 m × 400 m. We used SUMO program [28] to create real and random routes for 450 users. All the reported results are averaged over 30 different runs. In NRS, the Bloom filter size is computed to be 2,048 bits such that the false positive probability is at most 0.01 assuming 60 cells are in trip routes. In TRS, the time component is represented using 200 bits starting from 25 bits with an increment of 25 bits, while 48 bits are used for NRS. rider, and TOS to run NRS. Since the users send their requests/offers using their mobile phones that may have low computational power, reducing the computation overhead on the users is desirable. 3) Communication overhead: The amount of data transmitted during the communication between the users and the TOS.
Non
Experiment Results
Computation Overhead. Table 2 summarizes the computation overhead results of NRS versus CCRS. For the kNN encryption scheme, the secret key generation takes 198.4 sec for CCRS and 2.7 sec per user for our scheme. For encryption, the computation of an encrypted request takes 1.256 sec for CCRS and 0.145 sec for our scheme. Note that, the data vector in NRS is much shorter than that of CCRS, this because the driver's route in CCRS is represented by a vector with size equal to the total number of city cells setting only the driver's route cells in that vector. However in NRS, only route cells identifiers are added to the Bloom filter to be encrypted. Hence, NRS requires less time for inner product operations in comparison to CCRS. Search Time. Figure 10 gives the search time in milliseconds versus the number of requests. Two cases are considered; in the first case, the driver intends to share rides with only one rider. In the second case, driver intends to share ride with up to three rider. We also assumed that the driver's preferences are MP/MD, MP/RD, and MP/ED in order.
The figure shows that the search time in our scheme can be less than half that of CCRS. From the figure, when the number of requests is 50, 150 and 300 requests NRS achieves a 50, 60 and 65% reduction respectively compared to CCRS. This reduction can be attributed to the fact that in CCRS all the 15,687 cells must be represented in the pickup, dropoff and route vectors with 15,687 bits for each vector setting only the driver's route cells in that vector, while in NRS, only the cells of pickup/dropoff and routes were represented in Bloom filters with a small size. Consequently, CCRS requires more time for inner product operations to match users encryption to organize rides. The figure also shows that an increase in the number of rider requests increases the search time in the two schemes, but compared to CCRS, NRS requires much less search time. As a result, the search time for CCRS is more than that of NRS at different numbers of the rider requests. Communication Overhead. Figure 11 gives the communication overhead in KB versus the number of cells in number of cells. It compares CCRS to NRS with 0.1 and 0.01 false positive probabilities. As shown in the figure, for small cities with around 3,000 cells, both schemes have close communication overhead. However, the communication overhead of CCRS increases linearly with the city size while our scheme maintains almost a fixed overhead. This can be attributed to the fact that in CCRS all the city cells are represented in binary vector before encryption. On the other hand, increasing the number of cells almost has no impact on the communication overhead of our scheme because only the pickup, dropoff and route cells are stored in the Bloom filter. Note that, the number of cells can be increased by either increasing the city size or by using a finer grained partitioning for the same city for more accurate matching. Figure 11 also illustrates that less false positive rate requires more communication overhead because the size of the Bloom filter should increase. However, the communication overhead required in NRS is still much less than that of CCRS. Figure 12 gives the communication overhead for both schemes versus the false positive probability of the Bloom filter. As shown in the figure, CCRS has a constant communication overhead since it is independent of the false positive probability of the Bloom filter. However for NRS, as the Bloom filter size decreases (lower communication overhead), the false positive probability increases, hence , NRS requires less communication overhead and vice versa. Note that, the failure probability can be reduced exponentially as the number of returned results to the driver increases i.e. 0.1 R and 0.01 R where R is the number of returned riders.
Transferable ride sharing organization
Performance Metrics
Three performance metrics are used for the evaluation of TRS.
1) Vehicle service rate (SR). The average number of different requests that each ride can serve.
2)
Ride sharing success rate. The percentage of served rider requests to the total number of requests.
3) User's preference success rate. Percentage of satisfied requests based on the type of search preferences specified by users. Table 3 summarizes the computation overhead of our scheme. The required time to generate the secret key for each user to be used in the kNN encryption scheme is 39.80 ms. It is also worth mentioning that the keys can be used for a long period of time. For encryption, each driver takes on average 10.30 ms to compute I Ci R and I Ci D . On the other hand, the rider takes on average 0.06 ms to encrypt a request. This time is shorter than than route index generation because the rider sends only the encryption of the pickup and drop off location. For the TOS, the graph building of 30 offers takes 2.33 sec and Dijkstra's search for one request takes 0.29 sec. Figure 13 shows the average SR versus the number of requests, with different number of offers (30 and 50), Fig. 13 . SR per vehicle versus the number of requests using different numbers of drivers. and studying two rider's preferences (with and without transfer). We assume that the maximum number of users that can share a ride in the same vehicle is 5. The resolution of the bits of the trip time is set to 25 bits. The searching preference used in this figure is the M in c . It can be seen that SR of the TRS is about double that of the NRS. This indicates that more users can be served in transferable services. In addition, it shows that the SR increases as the number of requests increases. Also, as the number of requests increase, each vehicle can serve more than its actual capacity as many riders share a ride for only a part of the driver's route. However, in NRS, the situation is different since the riders' requests should match trip only one driver from the source to the destination, the SR of NRS is decreased. Figure 14 shows the ride sharing success rate versus the number of offers in a case of 100 requests. The maximum number of users in each vehicle is 5 users. The figure shows that the service rate increases with the number of offers. Also, it is shown that if the number of offers is 100, the service rate is 65%. This relatively low rate can be attributed to the assumption that the drivers already had a planned trips before receiving requests from riders, and not willing to take detours, so drivers might not always find a rider along his/her trips. On contrary, in ride hailing services the service rate may reach 100% as driver does not have a fixed route. Figure 15 gives the effect of the number of the time resolution bits on the SR of the vehicle. In this figure, we use TRS with M in c preference and different number of requests (150 and 300). As shown in the figure, it is clear that the increase of the number of time bits decreases the SR of the vehicle. This is because with more time bits, i.e, high resolution resolution, each bit spans a shorter period, which decreases the probability of matching offers and requests. Figure 16 gives the success rate of the different search preferences used in our scheme. In this figure, we used 100 random requests for each search preference. It can be seen that adding constrains to the search preference on the number of transfers, e.g., cases M in c,t , M ax c,t , and (M in c , M ax t ), reduces the ride sharing success rate, whereas search with a flexible transferable options, has more ride sharing success rate. This assure the idea that transferable service can improve each vehicle occupancy, hence, improves the ride sharing utilization. Figure 17 gives the communication overhead of NRS versus TRS using different number of cells to represent the trip data of the driver. For NRS, the driver needs to send vectors for pickup, dropoff, and route which are represented by Bloom filters with false positive probability less than 0.003 and less than 0.05 . For TRS, the driver needs to send a vector of 2k + bits for each cell on its route. From the figure, as the number of cells in the driver route increase NRS exhibits a linear communication overhead, this because the driver has to send the individual cells in its route for the TOS to build the directed graph. On the other hand, TRS exhibits a ladder steps behavior, this is due to the Bloom filters used by the driver which contains his route information. For the driver to keep the same false positive probability (i.e, 0.003 and 0.05 in Fig 17) , the Bloom filter size has to increase in a nonlinear behavior with the number of cells. From Figure 17 , although TRS scheme can organize non-transferable trips like NRS, it has greater communication overhead than NRS. The trade-off between the communication overhead and the false positive probability for NRS is shown in the figure.
Experiments Results and Discussion
Comparison between NRS and TRS
Although the false positive probability can be set to a very low value in NRS, the reliability of NRS can be increased more by returning two or three results to the driver to mitigate the effect of the false positive. For instance, if we returned three users when having 0.003 false positive error, the expected failure probability will not exceed 2.7 * 10 −8 which is a negligible value.
RELATED WORK
Recently, research in secure and privacy-preserving schemes for both ride-hailing [17] - [19] , [29] , ride sharing (carpooling) services [11] - [17] , and private navigation services [30] . The aim of ride-hailing services is to match the riding requests offered by a set of riders to a nearby driver in a real time fashion through a TOS (e.g., Uber and Lyft). On the other hand, carpooling services are motivated by the expected reduction in traffic congestion, pollution and cost when different car owners offer to share their trips with other passengers. Several papers studied the privacy issues associated with these two services [31] .
Oblivious privacy-preserving ride-hailing services were introduced in [18], [19] . A scheme, called PrivateRide, is proposed in [18] to provide anonymous ride-hailing services. In PrivateRide, a TOS receives a riding request from the rider which includes a cloaked location, to preserve privacy, as a tuple (x 1 , y 1 ) and (x 2 , y 2 ) that represents a rectangle that covers the true (x, y) coordinates of the rider location. Similarly, each driver sends a ride offer that includes his cloaked location, then the TOS matches the requests and the offers using the Euclidean distance. In [19] , a scheme called Oride, is proposed to improve PrivateRide by adding accountability and enhanced privacy by increasing the anonymity set for the number of rides from the same area on the same day. Oride employs somewhat homomorphic encryption system (SHE) to encrypt the locations of the drivers and riders so that the TOS can compute the Euclidean distance over encrypted data. In addition, Oride enables the TOS to revoke any misbehaving riders or drivers. However, in both PrivateRide and Oride schemes the TOS has to send to the rider the Euclidean distances for all the rider so that he can pick the one with the minimum distance which incurs a high communication overhead. The location obfuscation by cloaking technique has also been used in [29] . However, in cloaking technique, as the cloaked area increase as more privacy can be achieved but the utility of the data and thus the accuracy of the scheme reduces, this is infeasible in the applications that require fine grained location information. Wang et al. [17] proposed a privacy preserving ride hailing scheme that divides the ride sharing area recursively into quad regions stored into a quad tree. However, each user needs to send an encryption for each region in the map to report his/her location, which incurs a high communication overhead. In this paper, we used cryptography to preserve location privacy. The location's cell can be fine grained with acceptable overhead. Moreover, ride hailing solutions only aim to connect a rider to the closest driver which insufficient for ride sharing service due to the fixed route associated with each driver in the latter service.
For ride sharing services, meeting points determination has been investigated in [14] and [12] . These works aim to distribute the drivers to provide a good coverage over a given city, and, preserving the riders privacy using kanonymity model. Nevertheless, the fixed pickup points may require the driver to take a detour from his intended path while picking up or dropping off clients. Moreover, as the level of anonymity increases in these schemes, it becomes more difficult to ensure coverage and as it reduces, privacy lowers. Optimal assignment for drivers and riders pairs based on a global system parameters has been addressed in [15] and Aivodji2018. Both schemes use bipartite matching algorithm for this assignment. Ride sharing matching based on secure multi party computation has been addressed in [13] and [11] for privacy. However, all these schemes incurs high computation overhead and can not be used to organize transferable rides.
For navigation service, a privacy preserving shortest path computation scheme has been proposed in [30] . A graph compression algorithm was applied for real-time navigation on streets where a secure protocol is run between the user and the server. Nevertheless, this work incurs high computation overhead.
The closest work in the literature to this paper is the scheme proposed in [16] , called CCRS, which address only non-transferable ride sharing service. In CCRS, users (both riders and drivers) obscure their trip data from the TOS by using kNN encryption scheme. The TOS matches the ciphertext of the users and connects the users that can share rides. Unlike CCRS, this paper proposes two schemes for non-transferable and transferable services. The proposed schemes represents user's route data in a more efficient way than CCRS, where CCRS represents the whole city cells inside the route vector, setting only the user's route cells to one. However, in the proposed schemes, every cell has an identifier and the user's route vector encompasses only these identifiers, hence, efficient matching operations. Moreover, in CCRS, all the drivers share the same encryption key, which is less secure. In our schemes, each user has its own key for encryption.
Different from existing schemes, this work can either be applied to carpooling services or cab services. In addition, the proposed schemes offers flexible services selections to both riders and the drivers, which requires the TOS to perform complex operations over encrypted data. In particular, we leverage Dijkstra shortest path algorithm to offer transferable ride sharing service, where a rider can transfer between drivers during his/her trip. This can increase the ride sharing utilization with out degrading users' privacy.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an efficient privacy-preserving ride sharing organization schemes for transferable and nontransferable ride sharing services. In NRS, drivers' trip data and riders' requests are compactly stored in Bloom filters which are then encrypted using kNN encryption scheme. Then, TOS can perform similarity measurement over encrypted data to connect each rider with only one driver. In TRS, individual cells of each driver's trip data are encrypted using kNN encryption scheme, similarly, the riders' requests. The TOS uses drivers' trip data to create an encrypted directed graph for ride sharing organization. Riders' preferences are used to determine the type service (NRS or TRS), and hence the weights of the graph's edges. Then, a modified Dijkstra scheme is used by the TOS to organize shared rides by searching the encrypted graph. Our privacy analysis demonstrates that the proposed schemes can achieve users location privacy, trips data privacy, and identity anonymity. Our experimental results on a real map and using a set of routes extracted from the map demonstrate that the proposed schemes are efficient and can be used to share rides in small and large cities. Moreover, the results indicate that, TRS requires more communication overhead than the NRS. Nevertheless, TRS offers a flexible service that can increase the ride sharing utilization, whereas, NRS offers an efficient and useful service for elderly and disabled people who can not transfer between different drivers.
